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Abstract 
This paper analyzes how influence activities in the form of signal jamming affect the capital 
budgeting process of corporate organizations in Australia. First, the relationship between 
investment in the smallest division and its past performances is tested. The relationship is defined as 
investment sensitivity. Second, how the investment sensitivity varies as influence problems become 
more severe is examined. Finally, the relationship between compensation incentives for the large 
division manager and the investment sensitivity is reviewed. The findings suggest that investment 
sensitivity is positive for Australian firms. Mixed evidence is obtained between investment 
sensitivity and increase in the severity of influence problems when measures such as, relatedness 
and number of divisions are used. With increase in number of divisions, influence activity becomes 
more severe and headquarters relies more on public signal. However, with the increase in 
relatedness across divisions, influence problem increases and headquarters relies more on private 
information from manager of the large division. Evidence suggest that Australian firms provide 
high short term incentive payments to managers of large divisions to mitigate the influence activity 
problems and thus rely more on managerial recommendations for investing in smallest division as 
compared to noisy accounting measures.  
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1.  Introduction 
Efficient allocation of internal funds across divisions depends largely on the decisions of the 
CEOs  in  large  conglomerates.  The  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  on  internal  capital  market 
suggests that influence activity leads to misallocation of capital budget in a diversified firm and thus 
create value loss for  the firm. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) provide a formal model of influence 
activities to show how division managers spend their time in increasing outside options to strengthen 
their bargaining position with the CEOs. Moreover, the CEO, who derives private benefit from free 
cash flow of the company, misallocates company budget and pays division managers with capital 
budget  instead  of  the  free  cash  flow  of  the  company.  Consistent  with  the  theory  proposed  by 
Scharfstein  and  Stein  (2000),  McNeil  and  Smythe  (2009)  find  evidence  in  the  US  that  division 
managers with more lobbying power always manage to get more capital and free cash flows of the 
company albeit they are in charge of a weaker division.
1  
In contrast, Rajan et al. (2000) describes the rent-seeking activity as a form of power struggle
2 
within a company and propose that the driving force behind inefficient allocation in a diversified 
conglomerate is the diversity of investment opportunities and resources among the di visions of the 
firm. Alternatively, Wulf (1998; 2002; 2009) provide theory and evidence of influence activities in 
the form of signal jamming
3 and shows that for the US investment behavior in firms depends on 
influence activities in internal capital market .  To mitigate influence problems,  firms  can  either 
incorporate  investment  incentives  in  their  capital  budgeting  process   or  headquarters  can  offer 
compensation incentives which place a higher weight on firm performance as compared to divisional 
performance. 
The main drawback of the existing empirical literature on influence activities in internal capital 
market is that they are primarily confined to the US and the large European economies. Despite their 
importance, very little work, if any, has been undertaken to examine the extent of influence activities 
within firms in  the Australian economy. The Australian corporate governance system incorpor ates 
features from the US, the UK, the Germany and the Japanese corporate governance mechanisms to 
form its own tenets (Buchanan, 2004). Australia has developed a number of unique characteristics as 
compared to other OECD member economies. First, unlike in some companies in the US and the UK 
                                                           
1  Similar empirical findings are shown by Scharfstein (1998), Schoar (2002), Xuan (2008), and Glaser et al. 
(2011).  
2 The following example will describe power struggle. Chandler (1966) describes the capital budgeting process 
at General Motors under Durant‟s management in the following way: “When one of them [Division Managers] 
had a project why he would vote for his fellow members; if they would vote for his project, he would vote for 
theirs. It was a sort of horse trading.” 
3 Signal  jamming  is  a  process  where  the  division  manager  of  a  large  division  tries  to  distort  the  private 
information about investment opportunity of some other division in order to appropriate more funds for his own 
division. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) 2 
 
where the CEO plays a dual role, in Australia position of a CEO and a chairman are held by two 
different persons.
4 Because CEOs in Australia do not hold a dual position, most likely they are  less 
powerful and have less bargaining power compared to the CEOs in other countries with dual role s. 
Furthermore, if CEOs are less powerful, they might be easily influenced by the division managers of 
larger divisions leading to a larger distortion of capital budget.  
Second, poor performance has a lagged effect on CEO turnover in Australia as compared to the 
US and the UK, where CEO turnover results because of current performance (Suchard et al., 2001). 
This may provide lower incentive for monitoring by CEOs in Australia. Finally, in Australia CEOs 
receive lower stock based compensation as compared to their corresponding positions in the US and 
the UK (Kerin, 2003). Consequently, CEOs in Australia have less incentive to perform on behalf of 
the shareholders and more likely less capital will be allocated to smaller divisions and more capital 
will be allocated to larger divisions with better influential division managers. Given these differences 
between corporate governance system in Australia and the US and the UK, it would be interesting to 
empirically examine how influence activities affect allocation of resources inside conglomerates in 
Australia. 
Moreover,  in  a  recent  study,  Li  et  al.  (2011)  examine  the  relationship  between  executive 
compensation and corporate investment decision using Australian data and find that executives and 
directors focus on their equity based compensation while taking investment decisions for the firm. As 
equity based compensation increased relative to the market value of equity, higher investment is 
made. This may occur if managers believe that higher investment will lead to an increase in the 
volatility of the firm‟s shares and hence the value of their outstanding options will increase as well. 
This  evidence  indicates  the  presence  of  agency  problems  in  Australian  corporate  organizations. 
However, while the implications of agency theory have been empirically examined in the Australian 
context, those from inefficient internal capital market theory have not been studied for diversified 
firms in Australia. 
The main objective of this paper is to capture the effects of influence activity or rent-seeking by 
division managers on investment in the smallest division of the firm in Australia. In particular, this 
study analyzes how influence activities in the form of signal jamming affects the capital budgeting 
process of corporate organizations in Australia. In doing so, three related issues are examined. First, 
whether investment in the small division depends positively or negatively on its past performance is 
tested. If past performance is a good indicator of future performance, then a positive relation between 
the two is expected.  
Second, how the investment sensitivity varies as influence problems become more severe is 
studied. The relation between investment in the small division and its past performance is defined as 
the  investment  sensitivity  (Wulf,  2002).  If  headquarters  proactively  counters  the  large  division 
                                                           
4 Kiel and Nicholson (2003) found that CEO duality is less common in Australia as compared to the U.S. 3 
 
manager‟s influence activities by offering compensation incentives that depend on the performance of 
the  firm  as  a  whole,  then  the  large  division  manager  has  less  incentive  to  engage  in  influence 
activities. In this case, his private signal becomes more informative of the small division‟s investment 
opportunities.  Consequently,  investment  sensitivity  will  decrease  in  the  severity  of  influence 
problems. On the contrary, if headquarters does not rely much on compensation incentives, then the 
large  division manager‟s influence activities would result in less informative private signals. In this 
case, it is expected that the investment sensitivity will increase in the severity of influence problems. 
Finally, the relationship between  compensation incentives for the large division manager and the 
investment sensitivity is examined. Theoretical literature suggests a negative relation between the 
investment sensitivity and the use of compensation incentives that depend on the performance of the 
firm as a whole (Wulf, 2009). Empirically, lagged value of segment profitability is used as a proxy for 
public signal and the severity of influence problems is measured by relatedness between segments, the 
number of segments in the firm, and capital constraints. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 demonstrates the theoretical background behind the 
empirical analysis and lays down the issues to be empirically examined in this paper. Section 3 briefly 
discusses  the  data,  their  sources  and  the  sample  selection  process.  In  addition,  this  section 
meticulously discusses the construction of each variable required for empirical estimations. Section 4 
provides  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  empirical  methodology.  Section  5  reports  the  findings  and 
discusses their implications for Australian conglomerates. Section 6 concludes our discussion. 
2.  Theoretical Background 
This paper follows the theory on internal capital market and influence activity by Wulf (1998, 
2002). In this model, a hypothetical firm is assumed, which consists of the headquarters (H) and two 
divisions, one large and the other small. The headquarters faces a fixed capital budget and chooses to 
make new investments across divisions in order to maximize the returns from investment. One of the 
divisions is an old and established division with known returns headed by an influential division 
manager hereafter referred to as L. The other division is a small relatively new division of the firm 
with unknown returns which is referred to as S. The headquarters and L are the two active agents in 
the model whereas S is a passive agent throughout. The objective of the headquarters and L are 
different. L‟s objective is to maximize the capital allocated to his division and hence has an incentive 
to undertake costly influence activity in order to divert capital allocation by headquarters in his favor. 
The headquarters receives two types of signal about S from an investment committee (which includes 
L  as  well)  about  investment  opportunity  in  S:  a  subjective  signal  about  S‟s  type  which  can  be 
influenced and distorted by L and an objective signal such as past profitability, which cannot be 
distorted by L, however, is noisy.  4 
 
The profit maximizing strategy for the headquarters is to use a combination of both types of 
signals where the respective weights on each signal depends on the noise in past profitability, ability 
of L to distort information about S and the private cost of influence by L. Conversely H may use only 
one type of signal for extreme cases.  Wulf (2002) primarily focused on how the private cost of 
influence by L i.e. the weight placed on firm performance in L‟s compensation can be used to mitigate 
influencing by L. However this paper not only examines the above conjecture for Australia but also 
empirically  analyses  how  the  ability  to  distort  information  about  S  or  the  severity  of  influence 
problem  determines  H‟s  decision  to  place  different  weights  on  the  two  types  of  signals  about 
investment in S. 
H can use two types of instruments: investment incentives and compensation incentives, to 
prevent L from influencing. Investment incentives are based on capital budget allocated to the large 
division, which is inversely related to capital budget allocated to the small division since the amount 
of investment funds that the headquarters has in the internal capital market is fixed. For example, the 
type of investment contract which aims at preventing L from influencing would place a higher weight 
on the non-distortable public signal and a lower weight on the distortable private signal. This type of 
investment incentive makes the cost of influencing by L much higher than the gains from influencing. 
However, H can also design compensation incentives to increase the cost of influencing by L. H does 
this  by  making  L‟s  compensation  depend  more  on  firm  performance  as  compared  to  divisional 
performance. If L undertakes influence activities which lowers the overall value of the firm then such 
influence activity is costly for L. If H offers compensation contracts to L then H can rely more on 
private signal and less on noisy public signal about investment in S. Consequently, H can use either 
the investment incentives or the compensation incentives to prevent influence activity by L. Since 
these two incentives are substitutes the use of one lowers the marginal benefits of using the other 
contract. 
Wulf  (2002)  formalizes  the  tradeoff  between  the  two  types  of  incentives  in  the  following 
equation: 
       , , , 1 0 c A A I
S                                                                                                            (1) 
where 
S I is  the  investment  in  S,  0 A  is  the  initial  investment  in  S,  1 A is  the  function  of 
exogenous parameters of the model, c is the manager‟s private cost of influence,   is the L‟s ability 
to distort signals,   is  the  quality  of  the public  signal  and  is the public signal about S‟s type. 
Investment in S generates high returns if S is good type and low returns if S is bad type. Headquarters 
is not aware of the type of S but knows about the distribution of the type of S. Hence H knows θ is the 
probability that S is of bad type. It is important to note here that among the factors that affect
S I , 
while c is endogenously determined,   is an exogenous parameter of the model.  1 A  is defined as the 5 
 





A 1 . Investment 
incentive for L or  1 A  is the weight placed on the public signal for investment in S. Hence, if H decides 
to provide investment incentive to L, implies  1 A >0. This is because L would have less incentive to 
engage in costly influence activities when investment in S depends on non-distortable public signal. 
However the alternative hypothesis suggests that if H decides to provide compensation incentive to L 
then H would place less weight on the public signal and more weight on the private signal. When H 
links  L‟s  compensation  to  firm  performance  then  c  increases  and  as  a  result  influence  activity 
becomes unprofitable for L. Hence H can rely more on accurate private signal about investment 














Alternatively, it would be interesting to examine how H invests in smallest segment for various 
levels of influence activities by L. The focus is on the ability of L to distort priv ate signal about 
investment in smallest segment i.e.  . As the ability of L to distort private signal increases H can 
place either more weight or less weight on public signal depending on the type of incentive offered 
and the informativeness of the private signal. If influence problems, i.e. L‟s ability to distort signals (
 ) are more severe keeping other things constant, then firms should rely less on private signals and 
more  on  public  signals.  Hence  a  positive  relation  is  expected  between  the  severity  of  influence 











compensation  for L is  based  more  on  firm  performance  as  a  whole.  In  this case, private  signals 
become more informative since there will be less influence activities. Consequently, the proxies for 
the  severity  of  influence  problem  can  be  either  negatively  or  positively  related  to  investment 
sensitivity of the small segment depending on the type of incentive offered by H.  
3.  Data and Construction of Variables 
3.1. Data   
The sample in this paper consists of firms which were listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) in August 2009 and covers a period of 2004-2008. The firms in the sample belong to the 
following  Global  Industry  Classification  Standard  (GICS)  Industry  groups.  These  include:  (i) 
Automobile  and  components,  (ii)  Capital  goods,  (iii)  Consumer  durables  and  apparel,  (iv)  Food, 
beverage and tobacco, (v) Healthcare equipment and services, (vi) Materials, (vii) Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and life Sciences and (viii) Technology, hardware and equipment. Although some of 
the industry groups mentioned above do not seem to be associated with manufacturing operations, the 6 
 
actual firms in these industries, which are included in this analysis, have manufacturing operations as 
part of their organizational structure. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics. Among the industry groups, Materials has the maximum 
share (32.9%), followed by Capital goods (29.4%) and Food, Beverage and Tobacco (19.8%). Since 
this analysis requires information on compensation data and segment financial information for multi-
segment firms, firms which do not have more than one segment and do not have compensation data 
on multi segments were omitted from the sample. Thus, the sample selection is guided by two key 
factors: (a) Industry groups which had manufacturing operations and (b) availability of compensation 
data and segment financial information for the multi-segment firms in the sample. Based on available 
data, 46 multi-segment firms are included in the sample. Financial information on these firms is 
collected from Aspect Huntley FinAnalysis, Connect 4, COMPUSTAT Global, Orbis and Osiris.  
However  data  for  compensation  of  CEO  and  division  manager  is  not  readily  available. 
Compensation data for division manager and CEO compensation are manually collected from annual 
reports of these companies, which are available in Connect 4 Boardroom. Furthermore, firm segments 
are matched to their respective division manager manually which is quite intricate since the name of 
the segment is often difficult to match with the designation of the division manager. The data consist 
of an unbalanced panel of 46 firms for the period 2004-2008.
5  
The financial information collected for these companies include segment sales, assets, profits, 
total sales and total assets of the firm, number of segments in a firm  and cash paid for property plant 
and  equipment.  Moreover,  an  Australian  and  New  Zealand  Standard  Industrial  Classification 
(ANZSIC) code (as described in the Australian Bureau of Statistics database depending on the 
principal operation of that segment) is manually assigned to each of the segments in a firm. ANZS IC 
code is preferred to GICS codes, since ANZSIC codes would be more convenient due to their precise 
four digit nature in constructing the measures used in this analysis. Data on total remuneration, salary, 
bonus, LTIP (Long-term Incentive Payments), shares and options held, for both CEO and division 




                                                           
5 The sample consists of corporate giants such as BHP, Amcor, Orica, Boral, OneSteel etc. Although BHP is 
commonly known as mining giant, a closer look at the operating segments of BHP indicates operations in both 
Mining and Manufacturing. BHP belongs to the GICS industry group: Materials. In addition to having major 
operations in mining, BHP also produces aluminium products, metallurgical coal, stainless steel and petroleum 
products, which fall under manufacturing operations.  7 
 
3.2. Construction of Variables 
(i) Investment in the smallest segment: Investment in the smallest segment (
S
it I ) is measured 
by change in asset of that segment for firm „i‟ in the current period t. Thus the following expression 
holds. 
1 ) ln( ) ln(      t t
S
it Asset Asset I                (2) 
Even  though  segment  investment  is  generally  calculated  as  capital  expenditure  less 
depreciation, the databases used here do not contain such information. Hence following Eisenberg et 
al. (1998) and Titman and Wessels (1988), change in asset is used to measure investment in the 
smallest segment of the firm. For example change in asset of a particular segment in 2005 would be 
the logarithmic difference in its assets in 2005 as compared to 2004. The calculation of segment 
investment as logarithmic difference in its assets would mean there would be four observations per 
firm in the empirical estimations even though there is data for all five years. Thus firms which have 
four years of observations have three values and firms with three years of observations have two 
values for segment investment. The mean and standard deviation of change in assets for the smallest 
segments of firms in the sample are 0.17 and 0.84, respectively (see Table 1).  
(ii) Public signal: Public signal (
S
it 1   ) for investment in the smallest segment of the firm „i‟ in 
period t, is measured by the profit-asset ratio or profitability of that segment in the previous period, t-
1. Wulf (1998) provides two reasons in support of using lag value of profit per unit asset as a proxy 
for public signal against other measures: (a) it is not possible to calculate segment Tobin‟s q and 
industry Tobin‟s q does not reflect the segment investment opportunities and (b) since profits are 
more or less persistent, current profits are generally a good indicator of future profits. Table 1 reports 
that the mean and standard deviation of profitability of smallest segment of firms in the sample are 
0.14 and 0.68, respectively. 
(iii)  Firm  attributes  to  measure  influence  problem:  Firm  characteristics  such  as  degree  of 
diversification, organizational structure and financial strength makes the firm more prone to influence 
activities  by  L.  Relatedness  between  segments,  the  number  of  segments  in  the  firm  and  capital 
constraints are used as measures of firm attributes for influence problem. Each individual measure is 
described in greater details below. 
(iv) Relatedness between segments: If the divisions of a firm are more related to each other, 
then L will have more information about the investment prospect in the smallest division. H in that 
case would rely more on the information provided by L before investing in the smallest segment. L 
would also have greater ability to distort the actual investment opportunity in the smallest segment 8 
 
and  hence  will  have  a  greater  incentive  for  influencing  the  decision  of  H  owing  to  his  superior 
information. Consequently, more related are the divisions, the higher would be the ability of L to 
influence H‟s decision and provide corrupt private signals. 
itj rel  is a vector of five dummies which runs from  0 it rel  to  4 it rel and denotes increasing level 
of relatedness between the smallest and largest segment of the firm „i‟ at time „t‟ with number of 
segments „j‟. This variable is constructed by comparing the ANZSIC codes between the smallest and 
largest division of the firm. ANZSIC codes start with a letter representing the particular industry e.g. 
„C‟ stands for manufacturing and is followed by four digits. In the case of manufacturing the ANZSIC 
codes  start  with  „C2‟.  If  two  divisions  belong  to  different  industries  such  that  one  belongs  to 
manufacturing and the other is in mining then none of the digits of the ANZIC code would match. 
Hence  relatedness  between  such  segments  would  be  0  i.e.  those  two  divisions  are  completely 
unrelated. If two divisions have codes such that only the first digit matches then the related dummy 
takes  a  value  of  1.  This  means  that  the  smallest  and  the  largest  divisions  of  the  firm  are  only 
marginally related. If the first two digits of the code match then relatedness takes the value 2 implying 
that the firms are more related than when the relatedness dummy takes a value of 1. Likewise, when 
the first three digits of the code match, the relatedness is denoted by 3 and indicates that the divisions 
are  more  related  than  when  relatedness  was  denoted  by  2.  Finally,  if  all  four  digits  match  then 
relatedness is denoted by 4 and the divisions are highly related.  
Table 1 reports the distribution of the relatedness dummy in the sample for Australian firms. 
The relatedness increases from  0 it rel  to  4 it rel , where 47% of the sample is only marginally related, 
about 24% of the sample is more related when the relatedness dummy takes a value of 1, whereas 
only 7% of the sample is totally related to each other.  
Observation 1: Table 1 indicates that since most of the smallest and largest segments of the firm in 
the sample are unrelated to each other, influence problems may not be that severe for Australian 
firms. 
(v) Number of segments: If a firm has many divisions then it is difficult for the CEO and the 
investment committee to have all information about all of its divisions. Hence it is difficult for them 
to evaluate the small segment‟s investment prospects accurately. Since the large division manager is 
aware of this, he will have a greater ability as well as incentive to distort the investment opportunity 
of small division and to influence the headquarters. Hence number of divisions is used as another 
proxy for severity of influence problem. 
There  are  altogether  five  dummies  for  the  number  of  divisions  ( 2 it ndiv , 3 it ndiv ,  4 it ndiv ,
5 it ndiv ,  6 it ndiv ). One prerequisite of this empirical analysis is that firms  must have at l east two 
divisions. Table 1 reports that almost 33% of the sample has only two divisions, about 26% of the 9 
 
sample has three divisions, about 23% has four divisions, almost 6% has five divisions and 12% of the 
sample has six or more divisions. 
Observation 2: The distribution of number of divisions in the sample in Table 1 shows that very few 
firms in the sample have large numbers of divisions, which indicates that influence problems may not 
be that severe in Australia.  
(vi) Capital constraints: When capital is freely available in the firm then managers do not have 
to compete for it. However, if capital is scarce, division managers will undertake influence activities 
such that they can get a larger share of the scarce capital from the headquarters. Hence the more 
capital-constrained  is  a  firm,  the  more  severe  influence  problems  will  be.  The  various  ways  to 
measure financial constraints are leverage, dividend payout ratios, size of firm defined by sales and 
assets and access to public debt market. However, Wulf (1998, 2002) describes that access to public 
debt market is the least controversial in the financial literature, which examines whether a firm is 
capital constrained or not. She constructs a single dummy variable which takes the value of zero if a 
firm has a Standard and Poor‟s debt rating. This highlights that the firm is either unconstrained and 
takes the value of one, or zero otherwise denoting that the firm is capital constrained. In order to 
construct this variable for Australian firms, firms which have access to public debt markets i.e. those 
that have S&P credit ratings are checked (see Kashyap et al., 1994). However, since all the firms in 
the sample have S&P credit ratings, a vector of dummies  ij cap  is constructed for various levels of 
capital constraint, e.g.,  1 i cap denoting least constrained and  4 i cap  denotes most constrained in firm „i‟.  
S&P credit ratings can be broadly divided into two main groups: (a) investment grade which 
consist of AAA (highest credit quality), AA (very high credit quality), A (high credit quality) and 
BBB (good credit quality) and (b) noninvestment grade which consist of BB (speculative), B (highly 
speculative), and CCC up to D (decreasing level of credit worthiness). The sample consists of firms 
which have four types of credit ratings: AAA, A, BBB, B. Hence four dummy variables 1 i cap , 2 i cap , 
3 i cap , 4 i cap  are constructed depending on the S&P credit ratings.  1 i cap  takes the value of one if a 
firm has AAA rating and is zero otherwise.  2 i cap takes the value of one if the firm is rated as A and 
zero otherwise.  3 i cap  takes the value of one if a firm is rated as BBB and zero otherwise and to finish 
4 i cap  takes the value of one if the rating is B and zero otherwise. As a firm‟s rating decreases from 
AAA to B it will find it more difficult to raise sufficient funds in the external market. The summary 
statistics in Table 1 shows the distribution of cap dummy in the sample. Almost 67% of the sample 
has AAA credit rating whereas only about 4% of the sample has B credit rating.  10 
 
Observation 3: The sample distribution in Table 1 indicates that the majority of the firms have the 
highest  quality  credit  rating  and  thus  they  will  be  less  capital  constrained.  Consequently,  lower 
influence activities are expected for Australian firms. 
All three observations combined from the firm attributes indicate that there is a greater chance 
of lower influence activity present in Australian firms. However, proper empirical examination of the 
data is required before any definitive conclusion can be reached. 
(vii) Compensation incentives: Two types of compensation incentives to the division manager 
of the large division are considered: long-term incentive payments (LTIP) and short-term incentive 
payments  (STIP).  Both  LTIP  and  STIP  comprise  of  at  risk  payments.  LTIP  consists  of  at  risk 
components which are related to firm performance such as shares, options and equity, whereas STIP 
consists of salary and cash bonuses which depends on achieving annual financial, safety, business and 
personal goals. Consequently, managers earn a cash bonus if they achieve performance targets based 
on annual growth in sales revenue, segment EBIT, manufacturing profitability, profit attributable, new 
product  development  and  agreed  personal  objectives.  Since  LTIP  and  STIP  depend  on  firm 
performance, both of them can be effective in reducing L‟s incentive to influence. However since 
STIP depends both on firm performance as well as division performance it might reduce L‟s incentive 
to influence on the one hand and on the other hand it might increase L‟s incentive to influence. 
Nevertheless, which of these effects offsets the other is a matter of empirical investigation. 
CIitk  is  the  compensation  incentive  given  to  L  in  firm  „i‟,  at  period  „t‟  for  type  of 
compensation „k‟. „k‟ takes the values of lltdit and lstdit , which denote long-term and short-term 
incentive  payments  to    division  manager  of  large  division.  They  have  been  calculated  as  the 
proportion of LTIP and STIP in total remuneration of L.  
(viii) Control variables: Following Berger and Ofek (1995), information about the firm, such 
as growth opportunity (goit) and overall firm profitability (
F
it 1   ) are included in the empirical model 
as control variables in order to get a better idea about the division‟s investment prospects and to 
control for the other firm specific characteristics that may influence the investment in small segment 
of a firm. Without the inclusion of these control variables, the empirical model would be misspecified, 
and  estimated  coefficients  would  become  biased due  to the  problem  of  omitted  variables.  goit is 
measured by the ratio of total capital expenditure of the firm to total sales of the firm and 
F
it 1   is 
controlled through the lag value of total profitability of the firm (Wulf, 1999, 2002). The mean and 
standard deviation of the overall firm profitability are 11.92 and 0.78, respectively and of the growth 
opportunity are -5.56 and 24.60, respectively (see Table 1). 
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4.  Empirical Methodology  
This section focuses on the empirical formulation of the theory discussed in section 2. Primarily 
two key issues are examined for Australian conglomerates. First, how investment incentives affect the 
investment in the smallest segment of the firm is estimated. Second, the relationship between severity 
of influence problem and investment sensitivity is reviewed. The following regression equation is run: 
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In equation (3), investment in the smallest segment (
S
it I ) is regressed on past profitability (
S
it 1   )  of the smallest segment,  which  denotes  the  public  signal.  The  coefficient  1  measures  the 
division investment sensitivity to segment profitability in the previous period as a function of the 
proxies for severity of influence problem. As discussed in section 3.2 above, relatedness between 
segments ( itj rel ), the number of segments in the firm ( 1  itj ndiv )
 
and capital constraints ( ij cap ) are 
dummy variables representing the firm attributes for influence problem. Since all firms in the sample 
has  at  least  two  divisions,  1  itj ndiv
 
is  considered instead  of  itj ndiv . Growth  opportunity  (goit) and 
overall firm profitability (
F
it 1   ) are included as control variables,  t  is a time dummy variable for the 
years 2006 to 2008 and  it  is the disturbance term.  0 it rel ,  2 it ndiv and  1 i cap are base categories and 
hence  are  dropped  from  the  regression
6 Here   is  the  coefficient of
S
it 1   ,  which  denotes  the 
sensitivity of 0 it rel ,  2 it ndiv and 1 i cap . The base year is 2005 and hence the dummy corresponding to 
2005 is dropped from the estimations. 
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In order to examine the first issue, the sign of is important, which examines the relationship 
between investment incentives and the investment in the smallest segment of the firm. In other words, 
  measures  the  elasticity  between  the past  profitability  of  S  (public  signal)  and  the  current 
investment in S. If is positive and significant, then the past profitability of S is a good indicator of 
                                                           
6 If all the dummy variables are included in the regression, it leads to the “dummy variable trap”. At this stage 
the regression equation cannot be solved because of perfect multicollinearity. 12 
 
future  performance  and  therefore  investment  in  S  should  increase.  However,    measures  the 
elasticity only in the base model, where in a firm there are only two divisions or none of the divisions 
are much related to each other or neither of the divisions is capital constrained. This implies all the 
dummy variables ( itj rel ,  1  itj ndiv and  ij cap ) are zero.  
To test the second issue of the severity of influence problem (i.e. when public signal is noisy), 
now the dummy variables are considered different from zero. At this stage, it is important to inspect 
the sign of the coefficient, when   is added to each of the coefficient of the interaction terms with 
the dummy variables. For example, depending on the degree of relatedness captured by „j‟,  ) ( j     
measures the  elasticity  between past profitability of S and the  current investment in the  smallest 
division  when  the  divisions  are  more  related  to  each  other  (i.e.  itj rel >0).  Similarly,  ) ( j     
measures the  elasticity  between  past  profitability  of S and the  current investment in the  smallest 
division when there are more than two divisions in the firm (i.e.  1  itj ndiv >0) and finally  ) ( j     
measures the elasticity to the extent that the firm is capital constraint (i.e. ij cap >0). If investment 
sensitivity is positive in any of these three cases (i.e.  0 ) (   j    or  0 ) (   j    or  0 ) (   j   ), 
then even in the presence of influence problem the firm would prefer to invest more in its smallest 
segment, provided there is higher profit in the previous period. Moreover, different values of „j‟ will 
generate  different  magnitudes  of ) ( j    ,  ) ( j    and ) ( j    ,  which  reflect  the  changes  in 
investment sensitivity with higher or lower degree of influence activity by L. The above specification 
is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors to correct for small sample 
bias and heteroskedasticity. 
However, if the sum of these coefficients is negative, it demonstrates that investment sensitivity 
decreases as influence activities become more severe. In this case it is necessary to examine whether 
the decreasing relationship holds because of more compensation incentives used by H. Although the 
severity of influence activity in an organization is an exogenous variable, the headquarters can control 
influence activity by L through incentive compensation which is endogenously determined. Higher 
compensation incentives can align the division managers‟ incentives with those of the firm such that it 
would not be in the interest of L to undertake unproductive influence activities and hence private 
signals can become more reliable (Wulf, 2002).  In  order  to  test  this  third  issue,  compensation 
incentive to L (CIitk) and the corresponding interaction term with past profitability in S is introduced 
in equation (4) to take into account the private cost of influence by L (c). CIitk takes the values of lltdit 
and lstdit, which denote long-term (LTIP) and short-term (STIP) incentive payments to the division 
manager of large division. These compensation incentives are tested in two different models since 
these variables are highly correlated with each other. As a robustness measure the equation is also 
estimated  with  LTIP  and  STIP  both  included  in  a  single  equation.  However,  the  results  are  not 13 
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where k denotes the type of incentive compensation being tested. The coefficient  k  on the interaction 
term 
S
it itk CI 1 *   denotes the substitutability between investment and compensation incentives. The 
interpretation of the coefficient is same as explained above for the firm attributes in equation (4). 
) ( k     measures the elasticity between past profitability of S and the current investment in the 
smallest division when compensation incentives are provided to L (i.e. when CIitk >0). The sign of the 
coefficient on  k  is expected to be negative, because as H gives higher compensation incentives to L, 
it  relies  less  on  inaccurate  public  signals  and  hence  investment  sensitivity  decreases.  Pooled 
regression analysis is used to test the above issue.  
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1.  Influence Problems and Investment Incentives 
Table 2 presents the estimation results for various specifications of equation (4), which tests the 
following two issues for Australian conglomerates: (i) how past profitability in S (public signal) affect 
the investment in S in current period and (ii) the relationship between severity of influence problem 
and investment sensitivity. Model 1 incorporates two measures of influence activities: relatedness 
among divisions and number of divisions. Consequently, to capture different levels of relatedness and 
numbers of divisions in a firm, four relatedness dummies (relit1, relit2, relit3, relit4) and four division 
dummies (ndivit3, ndivit4, ndivit5, ndivit6) are included in Model 1.
7 Model 2 is re-estimated from Model 
1  by controlling for firm characteristics such as lagged value of firm profitability and growth 
opportunity.  Time-specific  effects  are  controlled  in  Model  2  by  introducing  time  dummies. 
Subsequently, Model 3 is a re -estimation of Model 1 by introducing anot her measure of influence 
activity, which takes into account  whether the firm is  capital constraint. Hence to capture different 
levels of capital constr aints,  three capital constraint dummies ( capi2,  capi3,  capi4)  are  included in 
                                                           
7 relit0 and ndivit2, which represents no relatedness among segments and two divisions in a firm, respectively, are 
considered as the base case when the dummies are equal to zero. The coefficient 
 
represents the investment 
sensitivity for the base case when there is no influence activity present in the model. 14 
 
Model 3.
8 Finally, control variables such as firm characteristics and time dummies are added in Model 
4. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Table 2 shows that the coefficient of 
S
it 1    in all four models is positive and significant at the 
5% critical level. Further Model 2 shows that the results obtained in Model 1 do not change after 
introduction of the control variables. Hence as past performance of S increases by 1%, investment in 
S increases by .25% to .27% assuming that the firm has only two divisions and they are completely 
unrelated to each other. In this case the dummy variables are all equal to zero. However, in order to 
examine  how  the  elasticity  of  investment  sensitivity  varies  as  influence  problems  become  more 
severe, it is necessary to look at the coefficients of the interaction terms. For example, if the number 
of divisions is two, but the relatedness increases from zero ( 0 1  it rel ) to one ( 1 1  it rel ), the elasticity 
changes from  to  ) ( 1    in equation (4), which is -1.044 (=0.267+ -1.311) in Model 1 and -0.96 
(= 0.255+ -1.215) in Model 2. In other words, because of influence activity by L, a 1% increase in 
past profitability in S reduces the investment in smallest division by 1.04% in Model 1 and 0.96% in 
Model 2. Likewise in equation (4) if the number of divisions is constant at two, but the relatedness 
increases  to  two,  three  and  four  ( i.e. 1 , 1 , 1 4 3 2    it it it rel rel rel ),  the  elasticity  value  changes  to
) ( 2    ,  ) ( 3    and ) ( 4    , respectively. Alternatively when the number of divisions in a firm 
is three (i.e. 0 1   ), the elasticity between investment sensitivity and various levels of relatedness is 
calculated by the coefficients ) ( 1    , ) ( 1 1      … ) ( 4 1      , respectively.  
In contrast, the relationship between investment sensitivity and the number of divisions in a 
firm is observed for different values of relatedness. For example, if the relatedness is initially zero, but 
the number of divisions increases from two ( 0 3  it ndiv ) to three ( 1 3  it ndiv ), the elasticity changes 
from    to ) ( 1    in  equation  (4),  which  is  1.557  (=0.267+1.290)  in  Model  1  and  1.389 
(=0.255+1.134) in Model 2. Thus a 1% increase in past profitability in S increases the investment in 
smallest division by 1.56% in Model 1 and 1.39% in Model 2. Here H relies more on public signal 
because of higher influence activity by L. Similarly, if relatedness is constant at zero, but the number 
of divisions increases to four, five and six (i.e. 1 , 1 , 1 6 5 4    it it it ndiv ndiv ndiv ), the elasticity changes to
) ( 2    ,  ) ( 3    and ) ( 4    , respectively in equation (4). Alternatively if relatedness value is one 
(i.e. 0 1   ),  the  variation  in  investment  sensitivity  for  different  numbers  of  divisions  would  be 
                                                           
8 capi1, which represents a firm has AAA rating and is not capital constraint, is dropped from Model 3 since it is 
considered as the base case when the capital constraint dummy is zero. Here the coefficient 
 
represents the 
investment sensitivity when the firm faces no shortage of capital. 15 
 
) ( 1 1      … ) ( 1 4      , respectively. These elasticity values corresponding to various levels of 
relatedness and number of divisions are calculated and reported in Table 3. 
The control variables in Model 2 and 4 in Table 2, which account for firm performance, do not 
have any significant impact on investment sensitivity. However the significant time dummies indicate 
that the economy or industry wide shocks affect every firm in that particular year. This could result 
from a particular policy change, demand or supply changes or any other factor that affects aggregate 
output. Such a change will not only affect investment in the overall firm but also investment in the 
small division. Finally, the coefficients of the interaction term involving segment profitability and the 
capital  constraint  dummies  are  not  statistically  significant  in  Model  3  and  Model  4.  The  capital 
constraint terms are insignificant, probably because most of the firms are large and there are not many 
variations in the credit ratings of firms. In the sample 67% firms have AAA credit rating, facing no 
capital constraints (see Table 1). Moreover, since in Table 2 for all four models the dummy groups are 
significant in some cases and insignificant in others, joint significance tests are conducted on each 
group of dummies. Results in Table 2 demonstrate that the number of divisions dummy as a group has 
a significant impact on investment in small segment in all four models.  
[Insert Table 3] 
Table 3 reports the sum of the coefficient of 
S
it 1   and the coefficients of the interaction terms 
with the dummy variables for all four models in Table 2. The p-values in Table 3 correspond to the 
joint significance test of the coefficient of 
S
it 1   and the corresponding coefficient of the interaction 
term with the dummy variable. Overall, Table 3 suggests that the investment sensitivity is negatively 
related to the relatedness between the large and small segments but positively related to the number of 
divisions in the firm. In practice the relatedness between segments can have positive and negative 
effects on investment sensitivity, both of which originate from the fact that L is more informed about 
the investment opportunity of the smallest division as they are more related. The positive effect counts 
since the large division manager‟s recommendation becomes more informative as the two divisions 
are more related. In contrast, relatedness can have negative effects since L is also more likely to 
engage in influence activities as the two divisions become  more related. Thus the final outcome 
depends upon which effect is stronger. However, as long as H controls L‟s influence activities through 
additional compensation incentives, the negative effects can be mitigated, in which case H can rely 
more on L‟s recommendation in determining investment in the small division. Thus in presence of 
compensation incentives, relatedness among segments can negatively affect investment sensitivity. 
The negative relationship between investment sensitivity and relatedness among divisions in Table 3 
highlights that headquarters in Australia might be successful in controlling L‟s influence activities 
through additional compensation incentives, such that there is no influence activity by large division 16 
 
manager. The presence of compensation incentives are examined in greater details in the next section 
5.2. 
Alternatively as the number of divisions in the firm increases, there is a higher chance of 
influence activities by L. This negative effects of influence activity are not compensated for by more 
information; more divisions in the firm would mean that headquarters is less likely to be informed 
about the investment prospect of the smallest division. In this case, headquarters does not benefit from 
providing compensation incentives to the manager of large division. Instead headquarters will rely 
more on the noisy public signal in determining investment in the small division. Thus a positive 
relation between the investment sensitivity and the number of divisions in the firm is expected (see 
Table 2).  
Together Table 2 and 3 describe the pattern of investment sensitivity present in Australian 
conglomerates, with different degrees of relatedness among divisions and the numbers of divisions in 
a firm. This pattern can be further verified in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) by allowing either relatedness 
among  divisions  to  vary  or  number  divisions to  vary,  while  keeping  the  other  variable  constant. 
Considering the regression estimates of Model 2 in Table 3,
9 Figure 1(a) illustrates the relationship 
between investment sensitivity and relatedness among divisions,  for different values of number of 
divisions in a firm. Likewise, Figure 1(b) is plotted from the  estimated coefficients of Model 2 in 
Table 3, which displays the relationship between investment sensitivity and number of divisions, for 
different values of relatedness.
10 
[Insert Figure 1(a) and 1(b)] 
Figure 1(a) demonstrates that the investment sensitivity in small division follows a „U‟ shaped 
pattern with a drop in investment sensitivity at relatedness values between 1 and 2. Changing the 
number of divisions from two to three or higher will shift the curve by the parameter γj, where „j‟ is 
the number of divisions. Consequently, Figure 1(b) demonstrates that the investment sensitivity in 
small division follows a „N‟ shaped pattern with an increase in number of divisions, which peaks at 4, 
then reaches the bottom at 5 and followed by a recovery at 6. Changing the relatedness value from 
zero to one or higher will shift the curve by the parameter βj, where „j‟ is the value of relatedness 
among segments. Moreover, since graphs in all different models have the same shape in Figures 1(a) 
and 1(b), the results in Table 3 are robust to their specifications. 
                                                           
9 Model 2 is considered to be the most robust among all four specifications in Tables 2 and 3. The coefficients of
S
it 1   , relatedness dummies and number of division dummies are robust and significant in Model 2, after adding 
the control variables and the time dummies to Model 1. In contrast, Model 3 and 4 do not give us any additional 
information since the capital constraint dummies are insignificant in both cases.  We have also tried plotting 
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) based on other models; the findings are very similar and can be obtained upon request. 
10 In plotting the series for Figures 1(a) and 1(b), the insignificant values in Table 3 are treated as zero, since 
they are not statistically different from zero in the estimations. 17 
 
The  finding  is  consistent  with  the  theoretical  predictions  of  Wulf  (1998),  where  H  allows 
influence  activities  if  the  firm  suffers  from  moderate  influence  problems  and  deters  influence 
activities at the two extremes. This is because if the divisions are completely unrelated (relatedness 
equals 0 in Figure 1(a)) or the number of divisions is low (lower or equal to 4 in Figure 1(b)), the cost 
of engaging in influence activities by L is very high with no additional benefits received by L. Thus H 
can rely more on public signal and the costs of satisfying incentive compatibilities are low. Moreover, 
when the divisions are very strongly related (relatedness equals 3 or more in Figure 1(a)) or with 
many number of divisions (6 or more in Figure 1(b)), there is greater chance that L will engage in 
influence activity and deliver corrupt private signal to H. If the costs from corrupt private signals are 
very high, H will rely more on public signal. Thus in these two extreme cases, H can deter influence 
activity by L by relying more on public signal and investment sensitivity increases.  
However, the problem is worse when the divisions are moderately related (relatedness equals 1 
or 2 in Figure 1(a)) or the number of divisions is few (5 in Figure 1(b)). Here once the CEO seeks 
advice from L, L has an incentive to move capital away from the moderately related small division 
towards his own division because higher internal capital will now positively affect the performance of 
the large division and also the firm. Here the costs of H in satisfying the incentive compatibilities are 
too high and thus H allows influence activity by L with a drop in investment sensitivity.  
5.2.  Influence Problems and Compensation Incentives 
The  findings  in  section  5.1  suggest  that  in  Australia  headquarters  might  be  successful  in 
mitigating influence activity by providing compensation incentives to L, where higher relatedness 
value among divisions is negatively related to investment sensitivity (Tables 2 and 3). To examine the 
issue further, this section presents the empirical results following equation (5), which examines the 
effects of compensation incentives to the manager of large division on investment sensitivity of the 
smallest segment in Australian firms.  
The sign of the coefficient  k   in equation (5) can be either positive or negative depending on 
whether H offers long term (LTIP) or short term (STIP) incentive payments to L. If H offers larger 
LTIP, which depend on firm performance, L will have lower incentive to distort private signal. Thus 
H can rely more on informative private signal and  k   is negative. However, two opposite effects work 
when H offers STIP to L, because STIP depend not only on firm performance but also on division 
performance. If H offers a high STIP which places a higher weight on firm performance then  k   
would be negative, similar to the case of LTIP. However, if STIP is offered such that more weight is 
placed on division performance, then L would engage more in influence activity and H would rely 
less on private signal. In Australia it is very difficult to predict how much weight is actually placed on 
division  performance  vis-à-vis  firm  performance  since  such  information  is  not  readily  available. 
Where more weight is placed on division performance STIP may fail to align the incentives of L with 18 
 
those of the firm. Thus H would rely more on public signal where a higher STIP will lead to an 
increase in investment sensitivity and  k   is positive. 
Columns (1), (2) and (3) in Table 4 respectively report the findings where 
S
it I  is regressed on 
short-term incentive dummy (lstdit) multiplied by past profitability of the smallest segment (
S
it 1   ), 
long-term incentive dummy (lltdit) multiplied by
S
it 1   and together the short-term (lstdit) and long-
term (lltdit) incentive dummies multiplied by
S
it 1   . In all three specifications, the severity of influence 
problems  is  controlled  by  relatedness  dummies  and  division  dummies.  Firm -specific  effects  are 
controlled by lagged firm profitability (
F
it 1   ), and growth opportunity (goit). Finally time dummies 
are used to control for time-specific effects.  
[Insert Table 4] 
  Table 4 shows that while the coefficient of the interaction term 
S
it 1   *lstdit, is negative and 
significant, the coefficient of the interaction term 
S
it 1   *lltdit, is not significant. Most of the signs and 
significance  levels  of relatedness  dummies,  division  dummies  and  other  control  variables  remain 
unchanged from that of Table 2. The joint significance tests reports that  together the relatedness 
dummies and division dummies groups are jointly significant in presence of incentive payments to L. 
The above findings suggest that short-term incentive payment has a significant role in allocation of 
capital to the smallest segment of the firm in Australia and is the main driving force in aligning L‟s 
incentives with shareholder interests.
11 In specification 1 of Table 4 if there is no incentive payment 
given to L, a 1% increase in past profitability leads to a 0.629% increase in investment in the smallest 
division. However, in the presence of STIP the relationship between past profitability and investment 
will have an elasticity equal to 0.121  (=0.629 +  -0.508).  The above findings  show  the relative 
importance placed by head office on the noisy public signal in the presence and absence of incentives 
payments. In this case, managers have less incentive to do wasteful rent -seeking activities and have 
more incentives to meet annual targets, which in turn allow H to place more weight on private signals 
for investing in the smallest segment. Thus investment sensitivity decreases.  
Moreover, after controlling for everything else such as relatedness and number of divisions in a 
firm, the magnitude of the public signal (
S
it 1   ) increases by more than two folds in presence of 
incentive payments in Table 4 as compared to no incentive payments in Table 2. The coefficient of 
past profitability in the smallest segment increases from 0.255 in Model 2 of Table 2 to 0.629 in 
Model 1 of Table 4. The coefficient of past profitability in the regression estimates is smaller in Table 
2 because it provides an average estimate without making any distinction whether inceptive payments 
                                                           
11 Kerin (2003) reports that in Australia the LTIPs in large conglomerates are comparatively small relative to the 
US. This finding highlights the fact that STIPs are more common in Australia than LTIPs.  19 
 
are  provided  to  the  manager  of  the  large  division.  Once  this  bias  is  corrected  in  Table  4,  the 
coefficient of past profitability truly captures the elasticity between the past performance and the 
current investment in the smallest division and the value increases. 
The reasons that the short-term incentives payments may be effective in offsetting influence 
problems by L are as follows. First, if short-term remuneration is contingent on achieving annual 
targets based on firm performance then L will engage less in influence activities that leads to loss of 
firm value. Secondly, division managers of large and matured divisions possess valuable information 
about investment prospect in firm‟s divisions which entitles them to certain information rent. If their 
remuneration includes this information rent then they might forgo wasteful rent-seeking activity (see 
Schoar,  2002;  Choe  and  Yin,  2009).  Hence  as  the  division  managers  receive  higher  short  term 
remuneration headquarters can rely more on private information about investment in S. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Finally, the mean values of short term incentive payments to L is shown in a two way tabular 
form in Table 5, which captures the effects of incentive payments to L with a change in relatedness 
values on one hand and number of divisions on the other. In Table 5 the numbers in bold show that for 
any given level of relatedness, the more divisions a firm has, the more short term incentives are given 
to the large division managers. However, at any given number of divisions, the incentive payments 
are on an average highest if the divisions are either moderately related or unrelated. These findings are 
consistent with section 5.1 and also with Wulf (1998), where influence activity by L is found to be 
more severe when the firms are fairly related and number of divisions increases moderately.    
6.  Conclusion 
  Despite the importance of efficient allocation of firm‟s internal capital on firm value, there is 
little empirical evidence on how influence activities by large division manager in multidivisional 
organizations in Australia affect the investment in their smallest division. This study contributes to the 
literature  by  examining  three  important  issues:  First,  the  relation  between  the  investment  in  the 
smallest  division  and  its  past  performance,  defined  as  investment  sensitivity,  is  examined.  This 
investment sensitivity (public signal) is found to be positive in section 5.1, indicating that H invests 
more in S as past performance increases. Second, mixed evidence is found in section 5.1 between the 
investment sensitivity and increase in the severity of influence problems when measures such as, 
relatedness and division dummies are used. The results show as the number of divisions increase in a 
firm, the informativeness of the private signal decreases and influence problems become more severe. 
Thus H would not rely on compensation incentives to L and investment sensitivity (public signal) 
increases.  20 
 
However, as the influence problem becomes more severe because of increase in relatedness 
between segments, headquarters relies more on private information from L. This may be because H 
successfully  offsets  the  negative  effects  of  increasing  relatedness  by  offering  appropriate 
compensation incentives to L. This third issue, which analyses the relationship between compensation 
incentives and investment sensitivity, is examined in section 5.2. A negative relationship is found 
between short-term incentives and investment sensitivity. This negative relationship indicates that 
Australian  firms  that  provide  high  short-term  incentive  payments  rely  more  on  managerial 
recommendations  for  investing  in  the  smallest  division  (private  signal)  as  compared  to  noisy 
accounting measures (public signal). Hence, findings indicate that short-term incentives may be the 
main driving force in aligning large division manager‟s incentives with shareholder‟s interests in 
Australia. 
Finally,  consistent  with  the  theoretical  predictions  of  Wulf  (1998),  this  paper  finds  that 
headquarters allows influence activity by large division manager if the firm suffers from moderate 
influence  problems  and  deters  influence  activities  at  the  other  two  extremes.  While  investment 
sensitivity in the smallest division follows a „U‟ shaped pattern with a drop in investment sensitivity 
at relatedness values between 1 and 2, the investment sensitivity follows an „N‟ shaped pattern with 
an increase in number of divisions, which peaks at 4, then reaches the bottom at 5 and followed by a 
recovery at 6. In presence of compensation incentives for any given level of relatedness, the more 
divisions  a  firm  has,  the  more  short  term  incentives  are  given  to  the  large  division  managers. 
However, at any given number of divisions, the incentive payments are on an average highest if the 
divisions are either moderately related or unrelated.  
Overall, in Australia the degree of influence activity by large division manager is  not that 
severe  compared to  other OECD  countries. This is indicated  primarily  by  the  three  observations 
obtained after analyzing the sample in section 3.2. These observations point out that the smallest and 
largest segments in many firms are unrelated to each other, very few firms in the sample have large 
number of divisions and majority of the firms enjoy highest credit ratings in Australia. Thus in firms 
if headquarters provides proper compensation incentives such as short-term incentive payments to 
large division managers, there is a lesser chance of influence activities by managers of large divisions 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean   Standard Deviation 
Assets ($ in billions)  0.405  1.310 
Log of Assets  18.210  1.910 
Investment in small segment (Δ assets)  0.170  0.840 
Profitability of segment   0.140  0.680 
Relatedness dummies  No. of observations in 
total sample 
% of observations in 
total sample 
Related = 0  96  47.060 
Related = 1  48  23.530 
Related = 2  26  12.750 
Related = 3  20  9.800 
Related = 4  14  6.860 
Number of divisions  No. of observations in 
total sample 
% of observations in 
total sample 
Number of divisions = 2  68  32.850 
Number of divisions = 3  53  25.600 
Number of divisions = 4  48  23.190 
Number of divisions = 5  13  6.280 
Number of divisions >= 6  25  12.080 
Capital constraint dummies  No. of observations in 
total sample 
% of observations in 
total sample 
Capital 1  139  67.15 
Capital 2  25  12.08 
Capital 3  34  16.43 
Capital 4  9  4.350 
Compensation to division managers  Mean   Standard Deviation 
LTIP  0.230  0.780 
STIP  0.870  1.260 
Other control variables  Mean   Standard Deviation 
Overall firm profitability   11.920  54.390 
Growth opportunity  -5.560  24.600 
Time Dummies  No. of observations in 
total sample 
% of observations in 
total sample 
2006  41  19.810 
2007  45  21.740 
2008  44  21.260 
Sub-Industries  No. of observations in 
total sample 
% of observations in 
total sample 
Automobile and components  10  4.830 
Capital goods  61  29.470 
Consumer durables and apparel  5  2.420 
Food Beverage and Tobacco  41  19.810 
Healthcare equipment and services  12  5.800 
Materials  68  32.850 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology and Life sciences  5  2.420 









Table  2:  Estimations  of  the  Effects  of  Severity  of  Influence  Problems  on  Investment 
Sensitivity of the Smallest Segment 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
S
it 1    
0.267** 
















































































goit    0.003 
(0.812) 
  0.003 
(0.684) 
F
it 1    
  0.002 
(0.906) 




  -0.335* 
(-1.876) 




  -0.208 
(-1.214) 




  -0.492** 
(-2.074) 
  -0.490** 
(-2.028) 
S






















N  145  145  145  145 
R-squared  0.162  0.205  0.165  0.207 
Joint Significance         
























Time dummies    1.810 
[0.15] 
  1.700 
[0.17] 
Note:  *denotes  10%  level  of  significance.  **  denotes  5%  level  of  significance.  ***  denotes  1%  level  of  significance. 
Coefficients are adjusted up to three decimal places. The figures in parentheses represent t-stat. Models 1-4 include (i) five 
relatedness categories (rel) of which
0 it rel is the base category, (ii) five segment categories (ndiv) of which 
2 it ndiv is the base 
category  and  (iii)  four  capital  constrained  categories  (cap)  of  which  1 i cap is  the  base  category.  The  coefficient  of 
S
it 1  
represents sensitivity for base categories:
  0 it rel , 
2 it ndiv and  1 i cap . The figures in square brackets for the joint significance 
test are p-values.  24 
 
Table 3: Calculation of Investment Sensitivity for Various Levels of Influence Activities 
Firm Characteristics  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
















































































1 i cap  




2 i cap  




3 i cap  




4 i cap  




 Note:*denotes  10%  level  of  significance.  **  denotes  5%  level  of  significance.  ***  denotes  1%  level  of 














Table  4:  Estimations  of  the  Effect  of  Compensation  Incentives  on  Investment  Sensitivity  of  the 
Smallest Segment 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
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it 1   *lstdit 
-0.508*** 
(-3.880) 




it 1   *lltdit 










N  118  101  101 
R-squared  0.289  0.362  0.374 























 Note:  *denotes  10%  level  of  significance.  **  denotes  5%  level  of  significance.  ***  denotes  1%  level  of 
significance. Coefficients are adjusted up to three decimal places. The figures in parentheses represent t-stat. 










Table 5: Relationship between Severities of the Influence Problems and Investment Sensitivity of the 
Smallest Segment in presence of Compensation Incentives 
Relatedness  Number of Divisions 
2  3  4  5  6 
0  0.724  0.743  0.834  1.207  0.747 
1  1.113  0.822  0.731  0.835  2.848 
2  0.689  0.634      0.592 
3  0.465    0.659    1.130 
4  0.615  0.773  0.814  0.842   
Note: The values represent the mean of lstd for different combinations of relatedness and number of divisions. 
The blank cells represent absence of data for lstd. For example, data in column 3 and row 3 shows that there is 




















Figure 1: Changes in Investment Sensitivity of the Smallest Segment in Australia with Severities of 
Influence Problems 
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